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INTRODUCTION 
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the 
settlement of a patent infringement suit in which the patentee 
of a branded pharmaceutical drug paid a large sum to a generic 
infringer to stay out of the market could be illegal under the 
antitrust laws.1 Further, courts assessing the antitrust 
illegality of such agreements need not evaluate the patent’s 
validity or infringement.2 Such settlements must be evaluated 
under antitrust’s rule of reason, although application need not 
require proof of everything that the long form rule of reason 
traditionally demands.3 
One surprising thing about Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion is its unexpected generality, in two important ways. 
First, in addressing the “basic question,” Justice Breyer opened 
his opinion with a story that had nothing explicitly to do with 
pharmaceuticals, generic drugs, or the Hatch-Waxman Act that 
has provoked numerous pay-for-delay settlements. Rather, it is 
about Company A, who sues Company B for patent 
infringement. Then they settle under terms in which Company 
B, the defendant, agrees “not to produce the patented product 
until the patent’s term expires,” and the patentee pays 
Company B “many millions of dollars.”4 The Court 
characterized the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, which the 
Supreme Court reversed, as nothing more than a “particular 
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 3. Id. at 2237–38. 
 4. Id. at 2227. 
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reverse payment settlement.”5 The Court later acknowledged 
that “[a]pparently most if not all reverse payment settlement 
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation.”6 As noted below, this produced a sharp 
disagreement with the dissent.7 The significance of this level of 
generality should not be lost. The Court’s subsequent analysis 
giving antitrust a much stronger voice in evaluating the 
legality of patent settlements can apply to many of them, both 
inside and outside the Hatch-Waxman context. 
Second, Justice Breyer’s opinion took a very general route 
in assessing the antitrust legality of pay-for-delay settlements, 
and one which refused to subordinate antitrust concerns to 
those of patent law, at least in areas where the Patent Act did 
not explicitly authorize the conduct in question. The obvious 
alternatives open to the Court were: 
1. Any settlement, including one that involves pay-for-
delay, is immune from antitrust attack if it is facially “within 
the scope of the patent.”8 For example, if a patent has six years 
remaining and the pay-for-delay exclusion agreement runs only 
five years, then the payment is lawful because the patent 
standing alone, if valid, would have kept the infringer out of 
the market in any event. Under this approach the court may 
not second guess the settlement by inquiring into the validity of 
the patent or the defendant’s actual infringement; the 
settlement itself shields these queries from the court, with a 
possible exception for egregious situations involving obviously 
invalid patents. That is, it creates an “almost unrebuttable 
presumption of patent validity,” and thus “assumes away the 
question being litigated in the underlying patent suit . . . .”9 
This is the approach that many lower courts have taken, 
                                                          
 5. Id. (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in FTC v. Watson 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013)). 
 6. Id. at 2227 (citing 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2046, 
at 338 (3d ed. 2012); Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for 
Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 11, 24 (2004) (additional 
citations omitted)). 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 43–58. 
 8. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If [a patent 
holder’s] actions are within the scope of the patent, they are not subject to 
antitrust scrutiny . . . .”). 
 9. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting the “scope of the patent” approach). 
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including the Eleventh Circuit decision that the Supreme Court 
reversed, and it is consistent with a long tradition of federal 
judicial deference to settlements of patent infringement 
disputes.10 Justice Breyer acknowledged a “general legal policy 
favoring the settlement of disputes.”11 
2. A settlement payment that seems very large in 
proportion to anticipated litigation costs is a sign that 
something is wrong with the patent. It is likely either invalid or 
not infringed. This should be construed as an invitation to open 
the question that courts traditionally avoid in challenges to 
settlements. They should look more closely at the underlying 
patent and the infringement action in order to determine 
whether the settlement is really a good faith attempt to 
manage litigation and business risk, given the general 
uncertainty of patent infringement lawsuit outcomes. Or is this 
simply an attempt to continue an unjustified stream of 
monopoly profits, albeit with two firms sharing it rather than 
one? Possibilities for this close look have included direct 
judicial evaluation of the patent or perhaps a call for re-
examination by the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO).12 
3. A large settlement exclusion payment disproportionate 
to litigation risk can be unlawful under antitrust’s rule of 
reason, without inquiry into whether the patent is actually 
invalid or not infringed, and even if the settlement agreement 
does not go “beyond the scope” of the patent’s nominal 
                                                          
 10. FTC v. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312 (“[A] reverse payment settlement is 
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within 
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”); see also In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d 
Cir. 2006); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304, 1308 
(11th Cir. 2003). On judicial deference to patent settlements, see generally 12 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2046. On the course taken by earlier decisions, 
see 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY & 
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 15.3a1(B) (2d ed. 
Supp. 2012). 
 11. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (citing several decisions). 
 12. See CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION 
WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION      
93–96 (2012); Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 
24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 324–26 (2011). 
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coverage. The plaintiff has the burden of showing both market 
power and competitive harm. 
4. Same as 3, except a large payment triggers a “quick 
look,” or truncated antitrust analysis in which the plaintiff can 
enjoy presumptions about market power or anticompetitive 
effect. The defendant has the burden of defending against these 
and showing offsetting defenses. 
5. Pay-for-delay settlements are unlawful per se—that is, 
the plaintiff need prove only that such an agreement exists; 
power and anticompetitive effects need not be proven. 
The Supreme Court chose the middle option, 3, but it made 
clear that the plaintiff need not make a full scale rule of reason 
showing, which traditionally requires definition of a relevant 
market, detailed proof of market power, and specific 
anticompetitive effects.13 
Stripped of nonessential regulatory detail, the pay-for-
delay issue looks like this: The Hatch-Waxman Act14 was 
intended to streamline the introduction of “bioequivalent” 
generic drugs upon expiration of a patent held by the pioneer 
drug developer.15 “Bioequivalent” means that the generic drug 
has the same active ingredients as the pioneer and can be 
expected to perform in the same way. As a result, it is subject 
to much less testing than the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) requires for new drugs.16 The Act permits a generic 
manufacturer who believes that a pioneer drug is about to go 
off patent or that existing patents are invalid to file an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) seeking approval 
for its generic alternative.17 At that time, if the pioneer believes 
otherwise, it may file a patent infringement lawsuit against the 
generic.18 The FDA must then withhold approval pending 
                                                          
 13. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38. 
 14. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 15. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing 
the generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, ‘speed[s] the 
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market’ . . . .” (quoting Caraco Pharm. 
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012))). 
 16. See id.; Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676. 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 18. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947, 
952 (2011). 
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litigation of up to thirty months until the patent dispute is 
resolved or settled.19 Once the generic wins the right to produce 
and begins marketing, it has a 180-day period of exclusivity 
during which no other generic may enter the market.20 During 
that time the market is a duopoly, with only the pioneer and 
the first generic as producers. However, a pay-for-delay 
settlement will delay the generic’s commercial entry, and thus 
the running of the exclusivity clock, for the duration of the 
settlement agreement.21 
Another significant thing about the Court’s decision is 
that, notwithstanding sharp differences on the issue before it, 
the Court unanimously agreed that “consumer welfare” rather 
than total welfare is the goal of antitrust enforcement.22 In 
general, consumer welfare looks at the welfare only of 
consumers, refusing to offset producer benefits against 
consumer harms. By contrast, total welfare looks at all welfare 
effects and nets them out. For example, if a practice harms 
consumers $3 million by higher prices but benefits producers 
by $4 million, perhaps by lowering production costs, then total 
welfare is larger even though consumers are worse off. The 
majority’s opinion was driven by a framework that equated 
harm with higher consumer prices, saying nothing about the 
welfare of producers. However, even Chief Justice Roberts’ 
dissent (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) acknowledged 
consumer welfare to be the goal: “The point of antitrust law is 
                                                          
 19. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent observed that the parties in this case 
had litigated three years before reaching their pay-for-delay settlement 
agreement. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Because 
the statute does not permit another generic to enter until litigation has run for 
thirty months, however, there is little incentive for the parties to reach an 
agreement earlier than that. 
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 21. The process is described briefly in Justice Breyer’s opinion. Actavis, 
133 S. Ct. at 2228. For more detail and analysis, see 12 HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 6, ¶ 2046c, at 340–41; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 18, at 956–58; C. 
Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1583–86 (2006) 
(describing the “statutory bounty” distinguishing first generic filers from 
subsequent challengers); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, 
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1719, 1754–56 (2003). 
 22. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (analyzing the consumer benefit 
provided by patent settlements); id. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer 
welfare.”23  
I. IMPACT OF PAY-FOR-DELAY SETTLEMENTS ON 
DRUG PRICES 
A pay-for-delay settlement preserves the exclusive right 
created by the patent but requires the patentee to share the 
profits with the first generic filer. Under well-established 
principles, the joint-maximizing rate of output and price for 
this two-person cartel will be precisely the same as if the 
monopoly were held by a single person;24 however, the size of 
the payment to the generic is an indeterminate rent. The 
arrangement is thus similar to a situation in which two firms 
cartelize their market but one of them shuts down its plant 
altogether while the other compensates it out of its monopoly 
profits. Formally, consumer welfare remains the same as it 
would be under continued monopoly production by a single 
firm. Justice Breyer cited opinions to the effect that payments 
to generic challengers to stay out often lead to generic profits 
that are even higher than they would make if they had 
litigated to a favorable result and started producing.25 That is 
necessarily the case if one takes litigation risk to the generic 
into account. That is, a generic would not accept such a 
settlement unless its expected value was at least as great as 
the expected value of production. 
Pioneer drug prices may actually rise after a large reverse 
payment settlement, depending on how the payment is 
structured. A lump sum payment made up front is a sunk cost. 
According to the standard economic literature, sunk costs have 
no impact on price.26 They are fixed costs, irreversible and 
made in the past.27 By contrast, prices are determined by 
reasonably anticipated marginal costs, which are a function of 
                                                          
 23. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §§ 4.1–4.2, at 158–78 (4th ed. 2011). 
 25. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra 
note 21, at 1581); see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 
RAND J. ECON. 391, 408 (2003). 
 26. See, e.g., LUKE M. FROEB ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 26 (3d ed. 
2014) (“Because [sunk] costs do not vary with decisions about changing 
output, they should be ignored in decisions about output changes.”). 
 27. See id. 
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variable costs.28 The empirical literature largely disagrees, 
however, finding that most firms account for sunk costs in ways 
that include them in variable costs, and thus makes them 
relevant to pricing.29 In any event, to the extent that the 
pioneer amortizes overhead, or if the pay-for-delay settlement 
has some variable cost characteristics (such as varying with 
sales volume), then the settlement might actually be calculated 
into the pioneer’s short-run costs and serve to increase its 
profit-maximizing price for the drug. Because the demand 
curve facing the pioneer is downward sloping, its price will rise 
as these costs rise. That result would be truly perverse, given 
the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman legislation, but price 
increases are clearly a possibility in some situations. 
In contrast, if the patent is declared invalid and generic 
entry occurs, two things will happen. First, the market will 
have two independent producers. Second, the period of 
exclusivity will be no longer than the 180 days following the 
generic’s market entry, after which additional generics can 
come in as well. 
How the market reacts to actual generic entry depends on 
how the two firms behave. At one extreme, they might enter 
into a cartel agreement, leaving price and output as they were 
prior to entry. However, this agreement could not hide behind a 
patent settlement and would be naked price-fixing, perhaps 
even a criminal offense. At the other extreme, the generic 
might immediately begin charging a competitive price, which 
could be much lower than the pioneer’s price, given its lower 
development costs. In an undifferentiated market the pioneer 
would have to respond with price cuts as well and the market 
could move quickly to the competitive level. 
In fact, pioneers do not always cut price in response to 
generic entry and in some cases even increase it, finding it 
more profitable to serve a small group of brand-sensitive 
customers at a higher price.30 That is to say, notwithstanding 
                                                          
 28. See, e.g., id. at 62–63. 
 29. See Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, The Sunk 
Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices (Oct. 25, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=825986 (summarizing and accounting for the literature). 
 30. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC 
STUDY 9 (2002) [hereinafter FTC STUDY], available at www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/
genericdrugstudy.pdf. 
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that generics are bioequivalent, post-entry markets sometimes 
reveal characteristics of product differentiation, namely, 
specific consumer brand preferences and differential pricing. To 
the extent that the Affordable Care Act, Medicare, or some 
other intermediary creates additional incentives for generic 
use, these effects may be mitigated. 
In intermediate cases the two firms might reach a tacit 
understanding about output or behave in other ways consistent 
with their position as duopolists, as well as their expectations 
about additional entry when the exclusivity period has expired. 
In these cases prices would very likely begin to come down, but 
how much and how quickly would depend on the 
circumstances.31 In general, retail prices for generic drugs run 
about 75% lower than for branded drugs.32 
II. SIZE OF PAYMENT AND RISK 
The size of the payment for delay can be relevant in 
several ways. First, it signals the degree of doubt about the 
underlying patent dispute. To illustrate, a landowner with a 
clear title does not ordinarily pay a trespasser large amounts of 
money to stay off her property. This has nothing to do with the 
number of alternative trespassers out there, but results from 
the fact that land title records are good, generally reliable, and 
thus expose the landowner to minimal risk. A very large 
payment from the landowner to the trespasser to stay off the 
land is thus an irrational act unless it reflects significant 
doubts about the quality of the title. 
While patents also confer “title” over their exclusionary 
power, clarity is more elusive. First, although patents on 
pioneer molecules, the “active” ingredient in most drugs, are 
among the most robust in the patent system, most of the 
questionable pay-for-delay settlements do not involve pioneer 
molecules. Rather, they are “evergreened” or extension patents 
for such secondary properties as new formulations, new 
                                                          
 31. See Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement 
Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 316 (2012) (concluding that a single generic 
entrant prices at 70%–88% of the pioneer’s pre-entry price). 
 32. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON 
MEDICARE’S PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 8–9 (2010), available at 
http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15-
prescriptiondrugs.pdf. 
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delivery mechanisms, new types of treatment, and the like.33 
That is, the patent is on something other than the primary 
active ingredient. The failure rate of these patents is much 
higher, and when generic challenges are litigated to completion 
the generic prevails more than two-thirds of the time.34 Most of 
the generic challenges are made to these secondary ingredient 
patents.35 The Solvay Pharmaceutical patent for Androgel, at 
issue in this case, is a likely illustration. The active ingredient, 
synthetic testosterone, had been around since 1935, and the gel 
delivery system that it incorporated had been commonly known 
for decades.36 
Payments whose size correlates with risk are essential to 
entrepreneurial decision making. As risk increases the relative 
size of the payoff must rise as well, or investment will not 
occur. In most cases, however, entrepreneurial risk is private, 
in the sense that the firm is risking the resources of its own 
shareholders. In the Hatch-Waxman pay-for-delay setting, 
however, what is being placed at risk is both the investment of 
the pioneer and the welfare of consumers, and these two 
interests pull in opposite directions. As the plaintiff’s chances 
of winning its infringement case drops, from say 80% to 20%, 
the plaintiff will be willing to pay much more to protect its 
asset. But consumers represent an important externality. They 
are not participants in this dispute, but they stand to lose the 
benefits of competition that would otherwise have occurred. 
The principal risk element in pay-for-delay cases is that the 
                                                          
 33. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation 
Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 354 (2007). 
 34. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the 
Supreme Court, 339 SCIENCE 1386, 1387 (Mar. 22, 2013); FTC STUDY, supra 
note 30, at 16 (finding that generic applicants prevailed 73% of the time); see 
also Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1673 
(2012) (permitting generics to challenge overly broad “use codes” that limited 
the applications of designated drugs). This compares to a general invalidity 
rate in the 40%–50% range for litigated patents. John R. Allison & Mark A. 
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA 
Q.J. 185, 194, 205–06 (1998). 
 35. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent 
Challenges, and Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 327, 334 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do 
Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 621 
(2011). 
 36. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable 
Relief ¶ 31, FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00955-TWT (N.D. Ga. 
May 28, 2009). 
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patent will be declared invalid. So the more questionable the 
patent—and thus the greater the likelihood that consumer 
benefits will be lost—the more the pioneer will be willing to pay 
to save it from challenge. As a result, the pay-for-delay 
settlement takes a patent whose probability of validity is 
relatively small, perhaps 35% or less, and turns it into a patent 
whose effective probability becomes close to 100% for the 
duration of the pay-for-delay settlement. This occurs by virtue 
of the fact that during this period no third potential producer 
may challenge the patent.37 
Ironically, if the value of the patent were zero, because it is 
clearly invalid, but courts were not able to examine it, then the 
profit-maximizing solution for the pioneer and the first generic 
would still be a pay-for-delay settlement, just as if the patent 
were of higher quality. The size of the payment would vary 
inversely with the patent’s perceived quality. One of the great 
unanticipated problems with the Hatch-Waxman procedure is 
that during the exclusivity period, the number of effective 
challengers to the patent is reduced to one, and the settlement 
effectively removes that one from the picture.38 
In sum, the likelihood of a pay-for-delay settlement is not 
driven by the likelihood that the patent will be found invalid, 
although the size of the settlement will be. The generic’s 
calculus depends on the size of anticipated profits under entry 
as opposed to the value of the settlement. Even if the generic 
believes there is a 100% likelihood that the patent will be found 
invalid, it may still be more valuable for the generic to share 
the monopoly returns with the pioneer patentee for the 
duration of the settlement agreement, rather than produce in 
competition with the pioneer. At the other extreme, the 
patentee who believes the patent is certainly valid and 
                                                          
 37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 38. The exclusive period runs from the time the generic’s ANDA is filed 
until thirty months after the patent infringement lawsuit is filed, or 180 days 
after generic production. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iii)–(iv) (2012). Unlike 
European Union (EU) law, the United States does not permit anyone to 
challenge a patent; that right is limited mainly to those charged with 
infringement or facing a realistic threat of an infringement claim. In this case 
the Hatch-Waxman Act, by its own terms, prevents everyone except the 
ANDA filer from infringing. On the European procedure, see Guidelines for 
Examination, Part D—Guidelines for Opposition and Limitation/Revocation 
Procedures, EUR. PAT. OFF., http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/
html/guidelines/e/d.htm (last updated Sept. 16, 2013). 
2014] ANTICOMPETITIVE PATENT SETTLEMENTS 13 
 
infringed may be willing to pay little more than a nuisance fee 
to avoid litigation costs, but any amount of uncertainty would 
likely provoke at least a modest settlement. 
In sum, the Hatch-Waxman litigation process invites the 
parties to privatize and share a stream of monopoly profits 
whose aggregate value does not depend on the validity of the 
patent. The exclusivity period conferred by the statute sees to 
that by preventing other generics from coming in even if the 
patent is worthless. For example, if the patent confers an 
exclusionary right worth $800 million over its remaining life, 
the pioneer and the first generic can share that amount with a 
suitably structured settlement, and the prohibition on outside 
challenges will leave that number unaffected by the value of 
the patent itself, which is effectively immune to challenge. 
The one possible exception is a direct consumer action 
attacking the settlement agreement.39 While the Supreme 
Court did not explore such actions, its substantial revision of 
the substantive law applies equally to private actions and it is 
reasonable to expect that several will emerge. The K-Dur 
decision in the Third Circuit permitted an action by direct 
purchasing consumers.40 Following Actavis, the Supreme Court 
vacated that decision insofar as it applied a “quick look” to the 
restraint, but it did not address any limitations on private 
plaintiff standing.41 Under Actavis, purchasers seeking 
antitrust overcharge damages from an anticompetitive pay-for-
delay settlement should be able to proceed without proving 
patent invalidity, although they would be subject to the same 
rule of reason constraints that the Court created for the FTC. 
III. UBIQUITY OF PAY-FOR DELAY SETTLEMENTS 
One important debate between the Actavis majority and 
dissent concerned the ubiquity of pay-for-delay settlements. 
Are such settlements a unique feature of the Hatch-Waxman 
                                                          
 39. Cf. Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503, 508 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (permitting consumers to challenge allegedly unlawful patent 
exclusion under antitrust laws). 
 40. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012), vacated sub 
nom. Merck & Co., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013); see 
also In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 691–92 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (permitting a consumer challenge to an agreement between pioneer 
and generic that allegedly inflated the price of the generic drug). 
 41. See Merck & Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2849. 
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regime, suggesting that they are not particularly important to 
the efficient functioning of the patent litigation system 
generally? Or are they quite common in the general give-and-
take of patent litigation settlements, although perhaps not 
particularly well publicized? The question is hardly trivial, 
given the majority’s conclusion that pay-for-delay patent 
settlements can restrain trade and thus violate the antitrust 
laws even if the patent is valid. The premise is that there are 
better, less anticompetitive ways to settle these disputes, 
including production licenses to the generic, and rule of reason 
analysis includes a query into the availability of less restrictive 
alternatives.42 
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent took issue with the 
majority’s conclusion that pay-for-delay settlements are 
virtually unknown outside the Hatch-Waxman context.43 He 
cited a law review article and the Respondent’s brief, which 
had mentioned a few cases.44 The Chief Justice then suggested 
that there might be “scores and scores” of such settlements, but 
they are not well known because they are private agreements.45 
None of the three cases that the respondents uncovered 
involved patents. The MGM decision involved a trademark 
dispute over the defendant’s use of “007” as a company and 
product name, which Metro claimed was owned by its affiliates 
as part of its James Bond 007 marks.46 The district court 
refused to issue a preliminary injunction, and the parties then 
settled under an arrangement in which Metro paid the 
infringement defendant $150,000.47 In exchange the defendant 
was permitted to continue to use “007” in its company name, 
but not on specific products.48 The $150,000 was almost 
certainly within litigation risks, particularly since the district 
                                                          
 42. On the relevance of less restrictive alternatives to rule of reason 
analysis, see 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 1505b, at 417–19 (3d ed. 2010). 
 43. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing 1 HOVENKAMP, JANIS, LEMLEY 
& LESLIE, supra note 10, § 15.3, at 15-45 n.161 (2d ed. Supp. 2011)). 
 44. See id. at 2243 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Marc G. 
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 1046 (2004)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. v. 007 Safety Prods., Inc., 183 F.3d 10 (1st 
Cir. 1999). 
 47. Id. at 13. 
 48. Id. 
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Court had denied a preliminary injunction.49 In In Time 
Products, the district court had also denied a preliminary 
injunction on the plaintiff’s claims for copyright and trade dress 
infringement committed by the defendant’s robot toys.50 At that 
point the plaintiff agreed to purchase the defendant’s allegedly 
infringing inventory for an amount of less than $200,000, plus 
an additional $150,000 for the destruction of other inventory.51 
Once again, these amounts seem to be within litigation risks, 
and are practically trivial when compared with the multi-
hundred-million dollar figures involved in some pay-for-delay 
pharmaceutical patent settlements. 
The only dispute cited by the respondents that produced a 
larger settlement, $20 million, was between Microsoft and 
Lindows.com, a company which made an open source Linux-
based operating system for computers with Windows 
architecture.52 Microsoft alleged that “Lindows” was 
confusingly similar to “Windows.”53 The background, which the 
respondents did not recite, is worth noting. Microsoft had 
already been denied a preliminary injunction twice, with the 
second decision concluding that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact whether the name “Windows” was generic and 
thus could not have trademark protection.54 At the time of the 
settlement the district court had already decided that the issue 
of genericness should be given to a jury, but it then certified 
that decision for interlocutory appeal.55 Previously the USPTO 
had twice refused to register “Windows” as a trademark 
because it believed the term to be generic, but then changed its 
mind without explanation.56 In sum, at the time of the 
                                                          
 49. Id. 
 50. In Time Prods., Ltd. v. Toy Biz, Inc., 38 F.3d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Douglas F. Gray, Microsoft Sues Lindows.com over Name, TECH 
HIVE (Dec. 21, 2001, 8:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/77163/
article.html. 
 53. See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 54 n.20, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705, at *54 n.20; Joris Evers, 
Microsoft, Lindows Make a Deal, TECH HIVE (July 19, 2004, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.techhive.com/article/116947/article.html. 
 54. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 WL 
32085605, at *3–5 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2002). 
 55. See Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2004 WL 
329250 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2004). 
 56. See id.; Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., No. C01-2115C, 2002 
WL 31499324 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2002). 
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settlement Microsoft faced a serious threat that it would lose 
its trademark on the “Windows” name. Twenty million dollars 
was a small price to pay. 
So, yes, there may be some reverse payment settlements 
outside the Hatch-Waxman context.57 Further, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ point that there could be many pay-for-delay patent 
settlements out there that have not been disclosed is well 
taken. Nevertheless, one would think that the interest groups 
in this case, with significant resources and patent experience, 
could have come up with more examples had they been there to 
discover, and perhaps at least one that involved patents. Based 
on this record, pay-for-delay seems to be predominantly if not 
exclusively a feature of the Hatch-Waxman Act.58 
IV. APPLYING ANTITRUST TO PAY-FOR-DELAY 
SETTLEMENTS 
A. PRE- VS. POST-ISSUANCE PRACTICES 
The patent regime is characterized by active regulatory 
scrutiny during the application and prosecution process, but 
very little scrutiny once a patent has issued.59 Well-established 
rules of implied antitrust immunity thus suggest that antitrust 
has little place as a governor of the patent issuance process,60 
but considerable room remains to apply antitrust to practices 
                                                          
 57. The term “pay-for-delay” seems inappropriate here, since the 
trademarks at issue in the discussed cases are of indefinite duration. These 
settlements were very likely “permanent,” keeping the defendant out of the 
market indefinitely. 
 58. Justice Breyer appropriately rejected a suggestion he attributed to the 
dissent that the patentee who settles for something less than its initial 
demand is effectively accepting a “reverse payment” for the balance. See 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2233 (discussing Schildkraut, supra note 44, at 1046). 
Justice Breyer referenced the patentee who demands $100 million for 
infringement by a producing infringer and ends up settling for $40 million, 
with the suggestion that this in fact amounts to a “reverse payment” of the 
unpaid $60 million. Id. In any event, in this story the alleged infringer 
actually produces rather than exiting from the market, and the size of the 
license fee is irrelevant. Indeed, in the absence of any infringement litigation 
whatsoever the patentee could lawfully accept any price it wished as a 
licensing fee from a producer. 
 59. BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 83–85. 
 60. See 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶ 240–244 (4th ed. 2013). 
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involving issued patents.61 Patents are property interests and 
assets, and can be made subject to antitrust rules governing 
mergers,62 price-fixing,63 tying,64 and other practices. 
Obviously, settlements of patent infringement suits are post-
issuance practices. The one clear exception to this rule is 
express immunity: if the Patent Act expressly authorizes a 
specific practice, then that practice standing alone cannot 
violate the more general antitrust laws.65 
The general rule of judicial deference to settlements of 
patent infringement suits rests mainly on a belief that, while 
patents are property interests, they are plagued with validity 
and boundary problems so severe that judges cannot have a 
great deal of confidence in the courts.66 They must defer to the 
parties’ reasonable, good faith assessments of likely outcomes 
and risk. Significantly, however, in most settlements the 
plaintiff and defendant have interests aligned against one 
another and the settlement contemplates a production license. 
As a result there is typically little reason for thinking that any 
nonparticipating interest group is significantly injured by the 
settlement and consumers typically benefit.67 By contrast, the 
impact of Hatch-Waxman’s generic exclusivity provision is 
                                                          
 61. Even the Supreme Court’s rule in Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food 
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965), involved, not the initial use of 
false statements about prior sales to obtain a patent, but rather the post-
issuance assertion of a patent known to be invalid in an infringement suit. See 
3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 706 (3d ed. 
2008). Under U.S. law, simply using fraud or inequitable conduct to obtain the 
patent is disciplined through the Patent Act and USPTO procedures rather 
than antitrust. See id. ¶ 706, at 255 (“As a general proposition, merely 
obtaining a patent by fraud with no subsequent enforcement attempt, is not 
an exclusionary practice under [antitrust law].”). 
 62. See 5 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 1202f, at 273 (3d ed. 2009) (patents are “assets” subject to antitrust merger 
laws). 
 63. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 315 (1948). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012) (prohibiting anticompetitive use of tying or 
exclusive dealing in goods, “whether patented or unpatented”). 
 65. On express immunity, see 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 60, 
¶ 243b, at 336–38. 
 66. Cf. Hemphill, Paying for Delay, supra note 21, at 1574 (“[A judicial 
reflex in favor of settlement] may be unusually acute due to the highly 
technical nature of pharmaceutical patent cases, which many federal judges 
prefer to avoid.”). 
 67. The exceptions are situations where the settlement also contemplates 
product price-fixing, market division, or some other restraint that may injure 
consumers. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2046b4–2046b5. 
18 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
frequently to align the interests of both plaintiff and defendant 
in favor of preserving exclusivity but sharing the proceeds, 
contrary to the interests of consumers. In these cases, the size 
of the settlement payment is undoubtedly a more reliable 
indicator of the parties’ own assessment of likely litigation 
outcomes than is any conclusion that can be drawn from the 
fact of settlement itself. 
As noted, outside the Hatch-Waxman context patent 
infringement lawsuits are very frequently settled by 
agreements that contemplate a license to the infringement 
defendant, with a payment from it to the patentee rather than 
vice-versa.68 Such licenses are expressly authorized by the 
Patent Act, whether or not they are preceded by a dispute.69 
Further, they ordinarily add one new producer into the market 
and presumptively increase output. As a result they do not 
frequently raise antitrust issues. Justice Breyer noted the 
Supreme Court’s pooling arrangement in the Standard Oil Co. 
(Indiana) case, which settled litigation by a broad cross-license 
that permitted all parties to practice, but also warned that it 
might not be so generous with agreements that threatened to 
dominate the industry and curtail production.70 
The traditional antitrust challenges to patent settlements 
have generally been to collateral provisions, such as product 
price-fixing between patentees and licensees,71 concerted 
refusals directed at others,72 or some market division 
agreements.73 While the Patent Act contemplates licensing and 
actual production by others,74 it nowhere justifies reverse 
payments to keep others out. This was relevant to Justice 
Breyer’s query whether “‘the patent statute specifically gives a 
                                                          
 68. See, e.g., Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in 
Reasonable Royalty Determinations, 49 IDEA 313, 315–16 (2009). 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 70. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232–33 (citing Standard Oil Co. 
(Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931)). 
 71. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 494 (1926) (upholding 
license agreement between patentee and a single producing licensee that fixed 
the latter’s product price); E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 
(1902) (upholding patent pool that fixed product price). 
 72. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963). 
 73. E.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); cf. 
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (applying per se rule to a 
horizontal trademark license agreement with territorial division). 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 261. 
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right’ to restrain competition in the manner challenged,”75 as 
well as his critique of the dissent because it did “not identify 
any patent statute that it understands to grant such a right [as 
reverse payment settlements] to a patentee, whether expressly 
or by fair implication.”76 He also noted that nothing in the 
Hatch-Waxman Act could be read as approving pay-for-delay 
settlements, but instead strongly indicated that its goal was to 
increase competition by facilitating the entry of generic drugs.77 
Closer antitrust scrutiny of practices that threaten 
competitive harm but are not expressly authorized by the 
Patent Act makes sense given the degree of producer influence 
over the drafting of patent legislation.78 At least since the 
passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the legislative drafting process 
has largely reflected the wishes of business firms who have a 
direct financial interest in the patent process. Consumer 
interests are largely ignored, even though their interests are 
most closely aligned with the general welfare. Consumers profit 
from cost-justified innovation in product quality and variety, as 
well as cost savings. By contrast, producer interests are much 
more diverse and more frequently aligned with increased 
protection for its own sake.79 This history has shown that 
producer interests opposed to a particular judicial 
interpretation of the Patent Act have been quite successful in 
obtaining changes. This was true, for example, of the 1952 
Patent Act, which was a reaction to what the Patent Bar 
perceived as excessive Supreme Court hostility toward 
patents.80 It was also true of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform 
                                                          
 75. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Line Material 
Co., 333 U.S. 287, 310–11 (1948)). 
 76. Id. at 2233. 
 77. Id. at 2234. 
 78. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual 
Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2200 (2000); Liza Vertinsky, 
Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
501, 526 (2010) (“Indeed, the role of industry groups in influencing and even 
drafting intellectual property legislation has been noted . . . .”). 
 79. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and 
Intellectual Property Law, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L J., Autumn 2013, at 53, 
61; Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. 
L. REV. 51, 52 n.2 (2010). 
 80. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at ch. 10 (forthcoming 2014); see 
also Nard, supra note 79, at 72 (“The heart of the 1952 Act was a direct 
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Act, which largely eliminated liability for patent tying in the 
absence of market power, as well as unilateral refusals to 
deal.81 If these interests believe that reverse payment 
settlements ought to have statutory approval, they are in the 
best position to obtain new legislation. As a result, there is 
much to be said for a judicial practice of looking at the 
challenged restraint to see if it poses a significant risk of 
competitive harm and then deferring to patent law only when 
the challenged practice is explicitly approved by the statute. 
B. RELEVANCE OF PATENT INVALIDITY OR NONINFRINGEMENT 
As noted above, Justice Breyer’s decision contemplated 
that a court could invalidate a pay-for delay settlement without 
digging into questions about validity or infringement.82 That 
conclusion will very likely be one of the more controversial 
parts of his opinion, but it is consistent with the FTC’s long 
held position. Justice Breyer also noted that, very likely in this 
case, the settlement’s “anticompetitive effects fall within the 
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”83 However, 
this fact was insufficient to “immunize the agreement from 
antitrust attack.”84 
On the question of judicial obligation to consider patent 
validity, the Court wrote: 
[I]t is normally not necessary to litigate patent validity to answer 
the antitrust question . . . . An unexplained large reverse payment 
itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts 
about the patent’s survival . . . . In a word, the size of the 
unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.85 
Later the Court reiterated that, although it was requiring 
a rule of reason treatment with the burden of proof generally 
on the plaintiff, this did not require the FTC to “litigate the 
patent’s validity, empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices 
                                                          
response to the Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence over the previous 
several years.”). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4)–(5) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); see also Christina 
Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 487–88 (2012). 
 82. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
 83. Id. at 2230. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2236–37 (emphasis added) (citing 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, 
¶ 2046, at 350–52). 
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of the patent system, present every possible supporting factor 
or refute every possible pro-defense theory.”86 This entails that 
patent validity is not a separate consideration for either the 
plaintiff’s case or the defense. Both would require litigation of 
the patent’s validity. 
In one sense, the size of the payment operates as a 
surrogate for direct patent-law-based questions about patent 
quality. Indeed, payment size may actually be a more reliable 
indicator to the extent it reflects the settling parties’ market-
based judgment about the patent’s probable prospects in a fully 
litigated infringement suit. Data on claim construction error 
rates,87 the high percentage of litigated patents found to be 
invalid, and high reversal rates,88 all suggest that the size of 
the payment may in fact be at least as good a tool for assessing 
patent quality as a direct look at the patent itself. This is most 
likely to be the case where the pay-for-delay settlement is on 
something other than the patent’s active ingredient, as in 
Actavis itself.89 
Beyond that, however, patent validity does not answer the 
antitrust question, which is whether a settlement of a 
particular type restrains trade unreasonably. As the majority 
observed: 
The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of 
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment. 
But, be that as it may, the payment (if otherwise unexplained) likely 
                                                          
 86. Id. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 
(1999) (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 1507, at 402 (1st ed. 1986))). 
 87. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 
246 (2008) (finding district court error rates in claim construction ranging 
from 25%–50%, depending on definitions used); see also J. Jonas Anderson & 
Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150360. 
 88. Allison & Lemley, supra note 34; see also Ted L. Field, “Juridical 
Hyperactivity” in the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 
721, 723 (2012) (finding the Federal Circuit’s reversal rates to be greater than 
other circuits studied). On district-specific reversal rates, see Teresa Lii, 
Shopping for Reversals: How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation 
Forums, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 31, 43 (2013) (looking at many district 
courts and finding a weighted average reversal rate of 37.8%). 
 89. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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seeks to prevent the risk of competition. And, as we have said, that 
consequence constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.90 
Further, it would be: 
[I]ncongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the 
settlement’s anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, 
rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust 
policies as well. And indeed, contrary to the Circuit’s view that the 
only pertinent question is whether “the settlement 
agreement . . . fall[s] within” the legitimate “scope” of the patent’s 
“exclusionary potential,” this Court has indicated that patent and 
antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the “scope of the 
patent monopoly”—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that 
is conferred by a patent.91 
A striking part of Justice Breyer’s discussion of Supreme 
Court precedent was its showing that restraints involving 
patents whose validity or coverage was not in dispute could 
nevertheless run afoul of the Sherman Act, even outside of the 
Hatch-Waxman context.92 In the process he gave the narrowest 
interpretation of the oft-criticized 1926 General Electric rule 
that the Supreme Court has ever stated, declaring that it 
“permitted a single patentee to grant to a single licensee a 
license containing a minimum resale price requirement.”93 The 
statement appears implicitly to overrule the Supreme Court’s 
Bement decision, which permitted product price-fixing among 
the numerous members of a patent pool.94 
C. THE RULE OF REASON FOR REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion rejected the Federal 
Trade Commission’s position in one significant respect: he 
declined to apply any kind of “quick look” analysis that granted 
the Commission a presumption of illegality. At the same time, 
however, the Court made clear that a “long form” rule of reason 
was not necessary either. 
                                                          
 90. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 91. Id. at 2231 (internal citation omitted). 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 2231 (“[C]ourts must ‘balance the privileges of [the 
patent holder] and its licensees under the patent grants with the prohibitions 
of the Sherman Act against combinations and attempts to monopolize.’” 
(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 390–91 (1948))). 
 93. Id. at 2232 (discussing United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 
489 (1926)). A few lower courts had adopted this formulation. See 12 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2041b. 
 94. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902). 
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In general, analysis of a contractual restraint under the 
rule of reason requires a showing of (1) power sufficient to 
warrant a conclusion of plausible competitive harm; (2) a 
restraint that threatens to reduce output or increase price and 
that (3) is not justified by efficiencies or some other redeeming 
virtue.95 Without departing from any of these principles, the 
majority’s opinion in Actavis permitted trial courts to 
“structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the one hand, 
the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper 
analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible fact 
or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed . . . .”96 
This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
historical reluctance to adopt any kind of bipolar distinction 
between a full “rule of reason” on one hand and a drastically 
abbreviated “quick look” on the other. Rather, the analysis is 
situational and requires the court to consider factors relevant 
to the question at hand and to create presumptions based on its 
estimate of likelihood of proof.97 The Court observed that 
“[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in appraising 
reasonableness,” and that “the quality of proof required should 
vary with the circumstances.”98 
The majority’s reasoning reflects the view that the various 
modes of antitrust analysis actually manage two variables at 
the same time. One variable is burdens of proof and 
presumptions, while the other has to do with the kind of 
evidence needed to carry one’s burden. The per se rule weighs 
both variables strongly in the plaintiff’s favor once per se 
conduct is shown. The “quick look,” as the FTC has formulated 
it, also created presumptions of power and harm in the 
plaintiff’s favor. By contrast, what the Actavis majority stated 
was that the presumptions continue to lie with the defendant, 
thus giving the plaintiff the burden of proof.99 However, the 
nature of the evidence needed to carry one’s burden can also 
vary with the circumstances. Here the Court was clear that 
more abbreviated proof than ordinarily attends the full rule of 
                                                          
 95. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, ¶ 1502, at 389. 
 96. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 97. See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, ¶¶ 1507, 1508c. 
 98. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237–38 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 
U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 86, ¶ 1507, 
at 402) (internal punctuation omitted)). 
 99. Id. at 2237. 
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reason was available for both power and anticompetitive 
effects. 
On power, the Court suggested that the “size of the 
payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective 
generic is itself a strong indicator of power.”100 That 
observation, which should dispense with any requirement of a 
relevant market definition, seems beyond dispute for very large 
payments. In a competitive market the value of keeping a 
competitor out is close to zero, but becomes higher as price-cost 
margins increase. Further, in these cases the duration of the 
monopoly is not infinite, but is limited by the remaining 
duration of the patent. A rational patentee would pay no more 
than the anticipated value of monopoly returns over the 
remaining period, so a large payment surely indicates power. 
Indeed, this form of more “direct” measurement is probably as 
good as or better than traditional market definition 
approaches.101 
One complaint about using a large payment as proof of 
power is that it ignores the high fixed costs of pioneer product 
development, which may require prices above short-run 
marginal costs so that fixed costs can be recovered. That 
argument misses Justice Breyer’s point, however. First, the 
fixed cost critique applies to one degree or another to all of our 
mechanisms for assessing power, including the Lerner Index 
and its many derivations,102 as well as even orthodox market 
delineation through the methodology of assuming a price 
increase to supracompetitive levels.103 In every case, high fixed 
costs tend to result in conclusions of greater market power or 
smaller markets, which is the same thing. Second, long-run 
ability to earn a profit is not the concern of antitrust market 
power assessment in any event. Fixed costs are one of the many 
risks that a firm undertakes, and they do so in a regime in 
which there is no defense to price-fixing, naked market 
division, or exclusionary practices on the theory that the 
practice is necessary to keep price/cost margins sufficiently 
                                                          
 100. Id. at 2236 (quoting 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, ¶ 2046, at 351). 
 101. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, JOHN L. SOLOW & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 515, 521 (3d ed. 2007) (describing price-cost margins in 
¶ 515 and direct measures based on demand elasticities in ¶ 521). 
 102. 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 520e (4th ed. forthcoming 2014). 
 103. Id. ¶¶ 536–539. 
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high to enable it to recover its investment. Even if we believed 
that a firm is entitled to use a collusive practice in order to 
obtain a margin sufficiently high to cover its fixed cost 
investment, this would not entail that it is entitled to recover 
the full monopoly profits available from that market. 
This latter point should not be lost because it explains why 
high fixed costs do not provide a general defense to collusion, 
whether in the Hatch-Waxman context or elsewhere. The 
amount of margin a firm needs to recover its fixed costs is a 
function of the magnitude of those costs and of aggregate price-
cost margins during the recovery period. By contrast, the 
monopoly price is a function of costs and market demand, and 
that number can be far, far higher. For example, a firm with 
marginal costs of eight dollars and high fixed costs may need a 
price of ten dollars in order to recover its fixed-cost investment. 
The monopoly price in that market might be fifteen dollars, 
depending on demand. Permitting collusion or market division 
without antitrust scrutiny allows the firm to earn the full 
monopoly markup. 
The rule of reason requires not only proof of power, but 
also of competitive harm, of which higher consumer prices or 
reduced output are the clearest types. Here, the Court noted 
that the size of the payment was also an indicator of 
competitive harm.104 A large payment would be an irrational 
act unless the patentee believed that generic production would 
cut into its profits. Here, “the likelihood of a reverse payment 
bringing about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its 
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation 
costs, its independence from other services for which it might 
represent payment, and the lack of any other convincing 
justification.”105 
The Court also noted that sometimes the agreements could 
have “redeeming virtues,” although the list Justice Breyer 
provided was not long.106 It included the observation that some 
settlements may constitute little more “than a rough 
approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the 
settlement.”107 In other cases the payment may constitute 
                                                          
 104. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 105. Id. at 2237. 
 106. Id. at 2236. 
 107. Id. 
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“compensation for other services” that the generic might 
perform, including distribution or market development.108 
Adequate proof would be required. 
Interests aligned with the drug companies were critical of 
the decision, suggesting that it will create uncertainty and 
discourage innovation.109 But that seems unlikely. First, a 
sensibly applied rule of reason as the Supreme Court majority 
outlined need not be complex, certainly not when compared to 
the general run of FTC antitrust cases. Very large payments 
shielding very weak patents from outsider scrutiny will occur 
much less frequently, but that is how it should be. 
Pharmaceutical developers will continue to have strong 
protection for primary patents on active ingredients, but 
weakened protection for secondary patents in areas where fully 
litigated invalidity rates are very high. Intermediate cases are 
more likely to be litigated to a validity decision or else settle by 
more traditional methods, including production licenses to 
generic infringement defendants or an agreement to delay 
entry but without any compensation to the generic. 
One important feature of traditional settlements such as 
production licenses is that they reflect adversity between the 
parties.110 The patentee wants to obtain as high a production 
royalty as possible and the infringement defendant wants to 
pay as little. The same thing is generally true of agreements 
delaying entry but without anything of value changing hands. 
Suppose that the pioneer simply agrees with the generic that 
the generic can enter several years from now and nothing of 
value changes hands. In that case the generic will want to 
make the delay as short as possible, while the pioneer will 
want to make it longer, and the parties have sufficient 
adversity to give us some confidence that a realistic assessment 
of the strength of the patent is included in their calculus. By 
contrast, the pay-for-delay settlement permits the parties to 
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 109. See, e.g., PhRMA Statement on Supreme Court Ruling in Patent 
Settlement Case, PHRMA (June 17, 2013), http://phrma.org/phrma-statement-
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share the full monopoly overcharge, giving each of them an 
expected value greater than the probable value of the patent in 
question. 
D. ADMINISTRABILITY 
The majority and the dissent stated starkly different views 
about administrability of an antitrust rule governing pay-for-
delay patent settlements. Justice Breyer wrote for the Court 
that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible 
administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.”111 In 
contrast, Chief Justice Roberts declared that he would “not 
subject basic questions of patent law to an unbounded inquiry 
under antitrust law, with its treble damages and famously 
burdensome discovery . . . .”112 
Of course, the simplest rule is no rule at all, and in that 
sense the Chief Justice is correct. On the other hand, the 
analytic approach that the majority developed is actually at the 
simpler range of antitrust doctrine, and certainly not as 
complex as a regime that would require a court to assess patent 
validity or weigh the impact of the settlement agreement on 
incentives to innovate. The pay-for-delay agreements in 
question are written and detailed, so proof of an agreement and 
its content is typically not in issue. Determining whether the 
agreement is unreasonably large in comparison with litigation 
costs should not prove burdensome either, because such data 
are kept and reported. The dissent cited one study indicating a 
number in the range of $10 million per lawsuit, somewhat 
higher than the cost of patent litigation generally.113 A good 
approach would be to start with a presumptive number of 
about that size, letting the parties dispute whether special 
factors in their case justify a number that is higher or lower. 
Determining the market value of any services actually 
rendered by the generic should not be complex either, given 
                                                          
 111. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. On how the lower courts should 
administer pay-for-delay antitrust challenges in the future, see Aaron Edlin, 
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 112. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2247 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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that these services are routinely sold in a broad market. The 
court needs to ensure mainly that the services are being priced 
at the reasonable market value of what is actually provided. 
For example, if general distributors are providing services of a 
certain kind for fifty cents per package, that number should 
serve as a benchmark for pricing of services in a settlement. 
The most difficult part of such cases—determining the validity 
of the patent—was made unnecessary by the Court’s antitrust-
centric approach. 
CONCLUSION 
The dissent suggested that a “patent carves out an 
exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”114 Given the 
high degree of federal regulatory supervision over the patent 
granting process, a regulatory exception for most pre-issuance 
conduct before the USPTO is in order. But once a patent issues 
it is largely an unregulated asset capable of both efficient and 
harmful use, just as any other business property. 
The dissent also posited what appears to be a false 
dichotomy: “We have never held that it violates the antitrust 
law for a competitor to refrain from challenging a patent. And 
by extension, we have long recognized that the settlement of 
patent litigation does not by itself violate the antitrust laws.”115 
Of course, unilateral failure to enter a market, whether by 
challenging a patent or otherwise, is virtually never an 
antitrust violation, while an agreement that one party will not 
enter clearly can be.116 The case that Chief Justice Roberts 
cited for the proposition that settlements do not violate the 
antitrust laws was Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), where the 
settlement involved cross-licensing and actual production by all 
of the parties.117 
The dissent also suggested that routinely approved 
settlements have included “licenses that fix prices, or 
agreements among competitors to divide territory.”118 The 
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record is in fact more mixed. Assuming that the Chief Justice 
was talking about product price-fixing rather than merely an 
agreement about the royalty rate of a negotiated license, then 
price-fixing is hardly routinely approved, save for the infamous 
“GE exception” discussed above.119 Territorial division 
agreements are usually lawful, but that is because the Patent 
Act contains an express provision authorizing patentees to 
stipulate territories in their license agreements, at least within 
the United States.120 The dissent’s statement that “a patent 
holder acting within the scope of its patent does not engage in 
any unlawful anticompetitive behavior”121 seems difficult to 
square with the routine application of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act to asset acquisitions of patents,122 notwithstanding that the 
Patent Act expressly permits assignments.123 Implicitly, then, 
it permits only assignments that are not found to be 
anticompetitive. The same thing is true of patent tying 
arrangements, which the Patent Act expressly shelters, but 
only if the patentee lacks market power;124 otherwise they are 
subject to routine antitrust analysis. 
On pay-for-delay itself, the Supreme Court’s decision was 
broad and clear, but it is also important for what it said about 
other cases. One theme that Justice Breyer’s majority opinion 
repeated is that extra antitrust deference is due to patent 
practices challenged under the Sherman Act when the practice 
is either expressly authorized by the Patent Act or is there “by 
fair implication.”125 When that is not the case, antitrust should 
be given greater rein. The Actavis decision thus invites the 
courts to consider the permissible scope of anticompetitive 
patent licensing, including restraints that settle disputes and 
those resulting from ordinary business transactions. Of these, 
pay-for-delay settlements are an important but hardly the only 
part. 
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